GEOPOLITICS OF 2020-2022 IMPACT ON THE SITUATION IN - 2023

INTRODUCTION

1. General Aspects Relating to the Geopolitical Situation. The period 2020-22 is being judged as a combination of closely progressing events which are already having an out of proportion effect on the Geopolitics of the world. Among the ones relevant are the Coronavirus Pandemic and its effects, China’s attempt at intimidation of India in Ladakh in April 2020 and beyond, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 and now the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. 

2. Seldom are there moments in history when Geopolitical situations distinctly change and triggers occur which force the world to change track in responses to diverse domains affected by such geopolitical shifts and changes. 1919, 1945-46, 1979-80, 1989-90 and 2001-02. These years obviously align with iconic events and need no second guessing what they signify.

3. From all indicators, after a turbulent period from 2014 to 2019 the world witnessed a change in the pattern of threats with the emergence of the Coronavirus Pandemic in the end of 2019. The threat of ISIS in the Middle East, the migrant issues involving displaced populations from North Africa and the Middle East moving into Europe, the rising tide of Global terror, the entry of Russia into war fighting in Syria, the rising ambitions of China through its grand initiative of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the impending higher prioritisation of the Indo-Pacific by the US and so many other international security considerations populated the period 2014-18. Each sent out its challenges differently making predictability almost impossible.

4. For India it was a period of transformation for national security as threats manifested differently. A distinct shift towards focusing on China commenced. The Indo-US relationship prospered through commonality of threat perception rising from China’s not so friendly disposition and ambition. India by and largely remained safe from global terror although the proxy war in J&K continued to fester. Networks spread through modern technologies of New Age Terror, but India’s contribution to the ISIS ranks remained distinctly low. By 2018 ISIS had been defeated but it has remained in a networked state without a high physical presence. The US efforts to find solutions to the Middle East’s numerous issues did not bear fruit, beyond the papering over attempted by President Trump. The international energy and economic scene did not face the turbulence which it faces today. threat perception rising from China’s not so friendly disposition and ambition. India by and largely remained safe from global terror although the proxy war in J&K continued to fester. Networks spread through modern technologies of New Age Terror, but India’s contribution to the ISIS ranks remained distinctly low. By 2018 ISIS had been defeated but it has remained in a networked state without a high physical presence. The US efforts to find solutions to the Middle East’s numerous issues did not bear fruit, beyond the papering over attempted by President Trump. The international energy and economic scene did not face the turbulence which it faces today.

5. It is imperative to understand the three-year hiatus that the pandemic brought in 2020-22 which upset a natural progression of Geopolitical, Geostrategic and Geo economic events that the world was otherwise facing and moving through. This phenomenon has resulted in a potential reset of the world and an unpredictable restart in 2023, portents of which are already visible at the end of 2022 with the extension of the war in Ukraine and the rekindling of the Taiwan issue.

ISSUES

6. With the above strategic backdrop it can be seen that the world is in a relatively watchful mood and violence levels are currently low. However, this is unlikely to last. Some issues which offer triggers for the progression into 2023 and beyond and give scope for prediction are important. These are:-

(a) Which conflict zone of the identified ones (or any other) is likely to trigger concerns early in the future, and why? 

(b) Does the Ukraine war give clear indicators that conventional wars will yet be long and expensive. Slap dash victories may not be expected?

(c) Does the Russian incapability to transform its military capability have any reflection on what one expects from the PLA?

(d) Is the Ukraine war now converging to a final victory for NATO-Ukraine. Are there likely to be outcomes in Europe, energy and food security and Russia’s control over the Black Sea? 

(e) Are the numerous sub conflicts of the Middle East likely to enhance or stabilize? Which could be the main driver that they may see revival of ‘pull threats’ to the US and its allies?

(f) We are finding the emerging importance of the Eurasian zone. Is Central Asia of particular concern and a potential next centre of conflict considering its geo-strategic location? The inclusion of Iran in SCO and the likely entry of Turkey in the near future does alter alignments. How should this be seen in the strategic short term?

(g) How would India’s display of strategic autonomy through the last nine months be assessed from the US point of view? Would the progression of the strategic Indo US relationship receive a setback?

(h) How does the above manifest in terms of benefit for Pakistan? Can Pakistan revive its capability of pursuing proxy war against India?

(j) Economic security is largely contingent upon maritime security and freedom of the seas. With the virtual clashes around Taiwan in 2022 has the US demonstrated sufficient will to prevent China exercising its strategy for eventual return of Taiwan to status of integration?

(k) In what manner is China likely to recommence its campaign on Taiwan in the third term of Xi Jinping?

(l) In view of the likely situation in the Indo-Pacific, which may not see rapid change for some time, what is likely to be China’s attitude towards India on the LAC? Is it likely that a return to wolf warrior diplomacy takes place?

RECOMMENDATIONS

US, NATO, RUSSIA AND CHINA

7. The pandemic may have weakened many national economies, with energy and food security now taking center stage, especially with the unpredictability wrought by the Ukraine war. It was accepted that the US political objective is to maintain its stature as the sole super power. No scaling down of economic predominance being the prime mover of power quotient. It wishes to continue to be the largest military with capacity and capability to project power anywhere in the world. This intent will bring it progressively into further clash of interests with China, contingent upon the ability of both to chart a predictable course as currently visible.

8. The US-China clash will dictate much of the international geopolitics of the next few years. India must not get drawn into the Sino-US clash of interests just because its current relations with China are not at the optimum level and trust is at a low. While India must pursue a policy of a strong relationship with the US through the Quad and other quasi/non military partnerships it must also remain engaged with China to expand mutual economic cooperation, restore trust and resolve conflicts. Specific to this, an Indian policy towards China could include the following:- 

(a) Impetus to infrastructure development, capability building & capacity enhancement.

(b) Vibrant village project - incentivize and encourage border area people to stay in villages, and check exodus from border villages.

(c) Three-D strategy to deter China’s aggressive behavior - Defend LAC; Dominate the oceans / Sea Lines of Communication & choke points; Deft diplomacy - bind to balance with nations with congruence and convergence of interests e.g. Quad.

(d) Review and reset India’s China policy. However, ensure the policy is not anti-China but pro-India, maintaining the principle that China respects strength. India can therefore afford no blinking and no wilting to brinkmanship

9. The model followed by India in its alignments during the ongoing war in Ukraine is a broadly acceptable one that caters to the strategic autonomy requirement. It must remain India’s hallmark.

10. India must not be misled by any assumption that a Sino-US conflict is inevitable. It will help us in adopting a more neutral stance rather than the slightly skewed pro US stance we tend to follow due to a fear syndrome.

11. The US is likely to face altered geopolitical alignments in the next few years as an outcome of the Ukraine war. A Sino-Russia cooperative front, a divided NATO, a stronger SCO with more nations stepping into it and the area of Eurasia gaining considerable significance.

12. India’s Taiwan policy must remain calibrated to our interests which are subject to second and third order effects. There is no need for India to display support for any of the strategies being played out.

13. Although Iran has defied the US for long its emergence into the mainstream with help of Russia and China appears imminent. India must work towards a more cooperative relationship with Iran and convince the US of the viability of working with India towards this end. India Russia trade and other engagement through the International North South Corridor should be encouraged to make India’s presence in the Eurasian belt more prominent and visible.

14. The war in Ukraine could end but not to a satisfactory and permanent solution. US interests hark on making the rise of Russia impossible. It wishes to strangulate the Russian access to the Black Sea and thus shut it out from warm water access. Russian annexation of Crimea and denial of access to the Black Sea to Ukraine is a major part of its strategy. The extent to which Putin has gone in this war proves what the East Europe region, the eastward march of NATO and the annexation of Donbass means to it.

MIDDLE EAST

15. The Middle East is yet not stabilized and the Abraham Accords are only a temporary patchwork of agreements between a few nations. The potential of the Middle East erupting and pulling the US back from focus in the Indo Pacific is currently remote. Indian interests in the Middle East remain constant – diaspora, job opportunities, remittances and goodwill. We must continue this successful policy without hiccups. Triggers may always be there in the form of the sub conflicts.

PAKISTAN

16. With a 34 bn USD national debt and devastation worth a reported 30-40 bn USD due to recent floods Pakistan has economic desperation written all over. Its problems extend to weak polity, poor leadership, a corrupt and self-aggrandizing Army, sectarianism and radicalization forming the core of the internal security problem. However, despite the negatives and the range of nontraditional security threats its antipathy against India is unlikely to reduce. The ceasefire at the LoC is likely to last for the foreseeable future.

17. Much depends on the government which will come to power in the elections likely to be held in Jul 2023. Imran Khan’s popularity is evident but how this translates into votes is uncertain. Imran Khan’s anti India, anti US and anti-Pak Army stance is unlikely to give him any base strength to support them. The Pak Army has already acted to ensure that his wings are clipped.
The current dispensation’s political leaning is yet to be established but it’s unlikely to be in favour of Imran Khan’s interests. It is assessed that the Pakistan Army is likely to wait and watch the situation in J&K as it has now crossed a threshold towards stability and peace. Nothing to trigger instability at the LoC is likely in the immediate future.

GLOBAL TERROR

18. While the phenomenon of global terror may have receded, the resources which enable it are all available in abundance and the networks continue to abound. Sub conflicts of the Middle East, such as Saudi-Iran, Saudi-Yemen, Israel-Syria etc offer scope for sub conventional mode of operations which expand the viability of terror as a weapon.

19. Afghanistan has sufficient ungovernable spaces to which international terror groups have gravitated to bide time and await opportunity. Global terror may not return in a hurry but it will creep back through smaller wars such the one on Turkey’s border against the Kurds.

SE ASIA

20. SE Asia has a lower footprint of terror threats. It is the Central Asian and Eurasian region which appears more vulnerable. If the war continues in Ukraine it could deteriorate into a proxy war fought through irregulars, to conserve resources which are fast depleting.

CENTRAL ASIA

21. Central Asia with 72 million Muslims, fair resources and ideological vulnerability is also a likely target for terror groups. Three things are evident viz :

(a) A huge financial network backs all such global terror efforts, with counter measures of equal quantum. FATF, Interpol and UN Security Council Counter Terrorism meeting, all being held in India in quick succession in India substantiated India’s long-standing claims that global terror was a serious threat and needs to be addressed through international cooperation.

(b) The use of social media and proliferating mass communication methodologies will only assist in the spread of ideologies. For positive narratives to counter these more international cooperation and support from academia, to include segments of civil society and intelligentsia is
a must. Exclusive think tanks will add measure.

(c) Global terror has not seen its end. Another cycle will re-emerge at a time when it has its parameters in place. The networks are likely to persist but remain low until a spectacular act is possible for high impact.

CONCLUSION

India must go beyond the domain of physically fighting and scoring success in reducing numbers of terrorists. The cognitive domain has to find equal emphasis and communication has to be institutionalized.