ROBUST COASTAL SECURITY NETWORK

Introduction

India has a 7500 km long coastline, about 1200 islands and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) spread over 2.2 million square km. It has ports and industrial hubs along the coast. 90 percent of India's trade (by volume) is by sea.

The 1993 Mumbai blasts pointed to vulnerability along India's coastline and the terrorist attack of 26 Nov 2011, revealed glaring weakness in the Coastal Security. Securing India's coastline and the EEZ involves multifarious agencies such as shipping, fisheries, customs, off share exploration / production agencies, tourism, scientific community, port authorities, coastal state/UT government and the state / UT local police. Coordination among them is a Herculean task. Coastal State / UT governments have been reluctant partners in overall coastal schemes.

Coastal Security Threat Perception

Coastal security implies protection of assets and infrastructure along the coast, preventing illegal exploitation of marine and mineral resources within the EEZ, freedom of navigation along the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) for merchant fleets and facilitating the nation's economy, including the “blue economy,” to grow.

Coastal Security aims to achieve the following :

• By continuous surveillance, monitor all activities in India's territorial waters, contiguous seas and EEZ
• Counter infiltration attempts and attacks from state and non-state actors.
• Prevent illegal economic exploitation of marine and mineral resources from the sea.
• Prevent smuggling of arms, explosives, drugs and other contraband material.
• Counter acts of piracy, hijacking and criminal acts.
• Act against the presence of unseaworthy vessels.

Setting up a Robust Coastal Security Network

Coastal security should be tiered in nature, with responsibility for each tier be allotted to a force which has the wherewithal and training for its task. During hot pursuit, the tier system may not be considered sacrosanct. There should be seamless flow of intelligence, with each tier having built-in capability to react first in its area of responsibility.

There is a requirement of a dedicated central force for coastal security under the Ministry of Home Affairs. There must be synergy between all agencies (Coastal Security Force, Coast Guard and Navy) which will be effected through periodic meeting and regular cross-training / exercises.

Marine Police

Till 26/11, Coastal States / UTs did not have any element of the local police looking the coastal waters.After 26/11 they were instructed to raise a Marine Police wing to patrol coastal seas upto 5km. However, the States/ UTs resorted to ad hoc measures, leading to the creation of a force incapable of carrying out its tasks. Coastal Police Stations are understaffed and operations suffer due to lack of suitable manpower. Poor training and lack of incentives to cover high risk inherent in such operations have largely been responsible for the inefficient setup. The setting up of the National Academy on Coastal Policing at Okha in District Dwarka, Gujarat is a commendable start. It is being piloted by the Bureau of Police Research and Development, with a core team from the Indian Navy, Coast Guard and BSF. The following additional measures need to be adopted to address the shortcomings :

• Include personnel from the fishing community who are adept at operating in differing sea conditions. Lack of educational qualification should not be a barrier for recruitment.
• The present training of marine policemen, conducted by the Coast Guard, is barely of four weeks duration, whereas recruits selected to join the Indian Navy or Coast Guard undergo nearly two and half years training. Marine police should be imparted training for one year at least to enable them to operate efficiently on the seas. A Central Coastal Force training institute should be set up for training personnel selected for Marine Police forces. This institute may also be made responsible for upgradation training and specialised training.
• Due to the ad hoc measures adopted to equip the Marine police, boats purchased are lying unused due to the lack of training in handling and maintenance issues. Training and long-term maintenance should be built into contracts with the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM).
• Jetties are required to be constructed for Marine Police craft. These should be constructed at the earliest or regular berthing space taken on long term lease from ports. Presently, the Marine Police craft are encroaching on the Fisheries Department Jetties.

Exploiting the Human Resource Capital of the Coastal Community

Interaction of the Navy, Coast Guard and Marine Police with the coastal community should institutionalised. Intelligence Bureau, Customs and Enforcement Directorate should also be incorporated in such interactions.

Schools for the children from the fishing community, on lines of Sainik Schools should be set up to draw young sailors for the Coast Guard, Marine Police and similar agencies.

 Registration of Sea Going Vessels

At present registration of sea going vessels above 20 meters in length is compulsory. However registration is not mandatory for vessels below 20 meters (a large number). It is also not compulsory for these vessels to have GPS and VHF / HF communication sets on board. The following should be made compulsory for them :

• It should be mandatory for all types of vessels going to sea or operating in backwaters/ rivers/lakes, irrespective of size, to have compulsory registration (as is the case with vehicles on land) with the port / coastal authorities. This will enable identification of owners, also.
• Every sea going vessel should be equipped with VHF / HF communication equipment and GPS compatible identification.
• Post 26/11, while initiatives were taken up to issue personal identity cards to coastal sea going communities, even now boats are often manned by personnel who lack identification/ verification of antecedents, hailing from different parts of the country. Crew manning sea going vessels should be in possession of suitable identity cards, post police verification. Maintaining record of the crew should also be mandatory.

Regulating Landing Points

The coastline has numerous landing points suitable for small vessels. Illegal activities like transfer of personnel or material can easily take place from these as it is difficult to maintain fool proof surveillance or security cover. State Governments need to identify and promulgate landing points and monitor movement at these. This would enable concerned agencies to be warned of undesirable activities taking place at unauthorised points, particularly if coastal communities are also involved. Coastal Police Stations should be given adequate legal powers and capabilities to check all landing points under their beat.

Closer interaction with coastal communities, including fisherman would make them feel as a part of the overall security setup. They need to be apprised that restrictions placed on their normal activities by the Police, Coast Guard or Navy are to protect them. Own agencies and establishments too must take care to keep the interest of the coastal communities in mind when placing curbs and restrictions.

Response Mechanism

Notwithstanding relations with neighbours, an assertive posture is necessary for operations on the high seas. On receipt of actionable intelligence, the first respondent should be the one nearest to the point where hostile / illegal activity is reported to be taking place. The Naval ship / Coast Guard vessels can build up to augment the forces. Helicopters aboard naval ships and ready availability of MARCOS should facilitate early response. Technological up-gradation and augmenting monitoring and surveillance capability must continue.

Maritime Domain Awareness

India has undertaken to share information on the seas with its neighbours, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. All relevant information would ultimately be fed to the International Fusion Centre in Gurugram. Cooperation from the neighbours would contribute immensely to aid Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). However, there is need to have a centralised system to collate information from all sources to include, HUMINT, Coastal surveillance radar systems Satellite imagery and other electronic sensors and electro optic sensors that are likely to be deployed, as presently there is no institutional architecture to collate all this information into intelligence and disseminate it in real time. For this the structure and functioning of the Joint Operations Centre's set up need to be strengthened.

Equipment Procurement

To standardize the profile of seagoing vessels and craft needed by the Marine Police, Customs and other agencies as also communication equipment, the qualitative requirement for them should be issued by one agency only, preferably the Navy in conjunction with Coast Guard.

The vessels being procured should include craft that can ply in shallow waters like airboats and Air Cushion Vehicles. The life cycle maintenance, provision of spares and tying up with OEM's for in-situ maintenance to reduce down time of any piece of equipment should also be contracted simultaneously.

Port Security

India has 16 major and 227 minor ports. Major ports have been assigned CISF security. 64 minor ports handle export-import cargo, 54 of which are International Ship and Port Facility Code (ISPS) compliant, while 10 are not. 163 ports lack requisite security. Even six years after sanction two major ports still do not have radiation detection equipment. 64 ports handling export-import cargo have no radiation detection equipment.

The provision of security to minor ports is the responsibility of the Coastal State Governments through their State Maritime Boards. The channel between anchorage (where a ship is anchored) to the port is about one to two kilometres. This area is very vulnerable to crime.

Port congestion, poor management and lack of facilities for dredging, mechanization and storage, effect operations to provide security and optimise capacity of ports. The new Maritime Agenda aims to quadruple cargo throughput by 2020, but most Indian ports are already operating at close to 100% capacity and any enhancement will require massive expansion programmes. Considerable planning and investment is required to bring Indian ports to international standards. In addition, hinterland connectivity in terms of efficient railroad and fast highway connections also need to be upgraded along with development of ports. Port security will be a vital factor in the mission to increase ports enhanced capacities.

Facilitating a Blue Economy

The livelihood of the population along the coast is linked to fishing. The Indian Fisheries Act has been in operation since 1897. Based on it coastal States/UTs have drafted their legislation. Fishing by non-mechanised and mechanised vessels has been laid down by each state/UT separately. However, uniform closure for 47 days is dictated for the East and West coasts during different periods by the Central government. One of the factors that is affecting the catch of the fishermen using non-mechanised craft is allowing industrial pollutants to flow into the sea. This has adversely affected marine life. Intervention by the Centre and National Green Tribunal is strongly recommended.

Nations that have a large community dependent on the sea for their livelihood have undertaken measures to augment the catches of fishing vessels and the variety of the catch. Fish Aggregating Devices tethered to the seabed are put up to attract fish and augment the catch of fishing vessels. Since such devices cannot be deployed by individual fishermen or groups of fishermen these should be undertaken by the State / UT governments or the Central Government.

Central Coastal Security Force

Coastal Security hinges on pro-active participation of State / UT Governments. This is often lacking. Though there are a number of Central Government Ministries and departments involved, but there is no single agency having overall authority. Unlike the deployment of BSF and ITBP along India's land borders which are under the Ministry of Home Affairs and managed by the Department of Border Management in the same Ministry, Coastal security is primarily the responsibility of Indian Navy and Coast Guard which is under the Ministry of Defence. This by itself is a major functional anomaly. Even the Marine Police is not under the Home Ministry being the local Police of the State/UT and as by the fact that local policing is a State subject.

Considering the many issues involved and lack of State / UT focus on this aspect of national security, there is a need to create a Coastal Security Force on the lines of the BSF with similar legal jurisdiction along the coast in a swathe five km into the sea from the base line and five km inland too, a total band of 10 km including land and sea. Also, since this zone is prone to crime which is the responsibility of the local police, therefore the local police should have Police Stations adjacent to the Coastal Security Force Posts to assist in curbing criminal activity and its investigations.

Conclusion

India has continued to be a target of terrorist attacks for over three decades. Coastal security is axiomatic to India's security and development goals. The tiered concept of security provided by the Navy, Coast Guard and Marine Police incorporating the Customs, Ports authority and Fisheries department is fundamentally sound. Round the clock vigil through assertive posture and deployment and optimized response capability should be the order of the day. While the Navy is anointed the lead authority for coastal security, the desired level of synergy between all ministries, departments and agencies continues to be lacking.

Designating landing points and monitoring these needs to commence at the earliest. Similarly, registration of all seagoing vessels of all sizes should also be expeditiously undertaken. Ownership of fishing vessels and verification of the crew also needs to be undertaken on a war footing. To implement these provisions for the states the Marine Police needs to be strengthened, suitably manned, equipped and very well trained.

Guarding the coast should be viewed the same as guarding the land borders of the country. Multiple agencies under no central controlling authority is the bête noire for accountability. Creating a Central Coastal Security Force like the BSF is the need of the hour, along with this Central Training Institute for training and specialisation should also be set up.